Resources and Incentives to Reform by Alberto Dalmazzo & Guido de Blasio
Resources and Incentives to Reform
ALBERTO DALMAZZO and GUIDO de BLASIO*
This paper models the incentives for a self-interested government to implement
“good policies.” While good policies lead to investment and growth, they also
reduce the government’s ability to reward its supporters. The model predicts that
resource abundance leads to poor policies and, consequently, to low investment.
The implications of the model are broadly supported by existing evidence. In par-
ticular, countries that are rich in natural resources tend to have low institutional
quality and poor macroeconomic and trade policies. [JEL D72, Q32]
R
ecent literature has attributed the low rates of investment and growth observed
in many African countries to a combination of poor infrastructure and bad
policies and institutions, such as insufficient economic liberalization, an unstable
macroeconomic environment, and poor political and legal frameworks (see Easterly
and Levine, 1997, and Collier and Gunning, 1999). This has been compounded
with a view that undemocratic governments might not be inclined to implement
reforms and establish public investment programs (see Ndulu and O’Connell,
1999). Some studies (Sachs and Warner, 1997, 1999) have emphasized the adverse
effects of natural resources, while others have questioned the effectiveness of for-
eign aid in stimulating economic development in poor countries (Tsikata, 1998, and
Dollar and Easterly, 1999).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple unifying explanation for these
facts. In particular, we consider a self-interested government’s incentives for
reform showing that the availability of resources, such as unconditional foreign
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ful comments and Stephanie Siciarz for editorial assistance.aid and natural resources, discourages the adoption of “good policies” and
eventually hampers investment and growth.
We focus on the incentives of self-interested governments to act in ways that
are in the interest of society.1 We consider a dictatorial government that has two
alternatives. It can either choose to keep “bad policies,” concentrating on loot-
seeking activities that exploit the country’s resources, or adopt “good policies,”
conceding some economic liberalization and investing in infrastructure, so as to
encourage investment and growth. From the government’s point of view, the ben-
efits of reforms are a larger national surplus, which can partly be appropriated by
those in power. However, good policies are costly to such a government, since
lower taxation, lower tariffs, less state control of the economy, etc., tend to reduce
the fraction of national surplus that the ruling elite can extract. We show that an
autocratic government will have less incentive for reform when the country’s
resources are abundant. This result has relevant implications for the effects of nat-
ural resource shocks and foreign aid on reform plans. In particular, the ruling elite
will react to positive resource shocks by implementing bad policies that allow for
increased surplus appropriation.2
The implications of our model are related to other works. A number of stud-
ies concentrate on the impact of aid and natural resources on growth in countries
ruled by an elite. Boone (1996) shows that aid is mostly wasted in elitist regimes.
Tornell and Lane (1999) argue that windfalls increase the rent-seeking behavior of
powerful groups, reducing growth. Under similar assumptions, Svensson (2000a)
shows that foreign aid and natural resource shocks tend to reduce the provision of
public goods. Unlike ours, these papers do not explicitly analyze the incentive for
the incumbent government to implement “good policies.” An exception is that of
Svensson (1998), who develops a model in which insecure property rights hamper
private investment. In examining a government’s incentive to invest in “legal
infrastructure,” Svensson shows that political instability discourages reforms of
the legal system. This model has two main differences from ours. First, it crucially
builds on “political risk.” Second, although it focuses on the incentives for reform,
it is not directly concerned with the role of natural resources or international aid
on the behavior of governments.
Several papers concentrate on the political effect of reforms. Acemoglu and
Robinson (1998, 1999, 2001) consider the pressure to democratize imposed on the
ruling elite by the threat of a revolution. By contrast, Robinson (1999) develops a
formal model in which an autocratic government may avoid supplying public
goods so as to reduce the likelihood of “collective actions,” such as revolutions, by
citizens. Similar arguments are put forward by La Ferrara (1996) and Wantchekon
(2000). In particular, Wantchekon argues that authoritarian governments use
resource windfalls to “buy off” potential opponents and strengthen their own
power. Those papers rely on different, and often opposite, assumptions about the
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1See McGuire and Olson (1996).
2Since the basic model hinges on a deep divergence of interests between the dominating group and
the rest of society, our approach bears some similarities to agency theories of corporate governance: see
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Without pushing the analogy too far, one can think of the incumbent govern-
ment as self-interested management that faces dispersed shareholders (the society). relationship between political support and reforms. In contrast, we show that the
results of our model hold regardless of whether good policies strengthen or
weaken support for the incumbent government.
We also survey the empirical evidence on the relationship between economic
performance, quality of policies, and resource abundance. The predictions of the
model are widely supported. In particular, the existing evidence suggests that 
(i) the quality of policies has relevant effects on economic performance and 
(ii) resource abundance reduces the incentives to implement “good policies.”
I. The Model
We start by considering the basic case of a dictatorial government. We then ana-
lyze the impact of aid on policies and investigate possible remedies to encourage
reform. We also consider some extensions to the basic model.
Dictatorial Government
We consider a country that has a net endowment of Z=R+A,w here R denotes
natural resources, such as revenues from primary commodities, and A the amount
of donations received from abroad. Society is composed of n≥ 2 equally sized
groups. In the simpler version of the model, we suppose that the country is ruled
by a government that is only interested in the welfare of its particular group3 and
its objective function is given by
U(Ci)=Ci, (1)
where Ci denotes the consumption of the government’s supporters. In this case, the
government places no importance on the welfare of the remaining (n–1) groups
in the society, defined as U(Cr)=C r.
4
The government can appropriate a fraction φ∈ (0,1) of the national surplus—
which will be defined later—with a certain probability p∈ (0,1). The probability p
denotes the likelihood that the government will remain in power and carry out its pro-
gram. We assume that φ and p are both functions of a country’s economic liberties,
whose level is denoted by Q, with Q∈ [0,Q –]. Our notion of “liberalization” includes
several factors. On the one hand, it can entail higher institutional quality, such as less
corruption and greater “rule of law.” On the other, it can be reflected in trade and
macroeconomic policies, such as lower tariffs and lower government consumption.
In what follows, we assume that φ′ (Q)<0, and φ′′ (Q)<0: the government’s
ability to appropriate resources decreases as Q increases. In our view, then,
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3McGuire and Olson (1996) define this as the “autocrat” or “dictatorial ruler” case. This extreme
assumption is not at odds with the political experience of sub-Saharan Africa, where most countries have
been ruled by nondemocratic governments: see Bratton and van der Walle (1997).
4Tornell and Lane (1999) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) present opposing groups in society
through a fully developed political economy game. Here we restrict our attention to the analysis of the
incentives of the incumbent government in order to emphasize the relationship between reforms and
resource abundance.economic liberalization affects the ruling elite by reducing its ability to prey on the
national surplus (through taxes and more direct appropriation methods, such as
theft, bribery, licensing, etc.). The idea that φ is reduced by reforms constitutes a
crucial difference from Robinson (1999), where the fraction of surplus appropria-
tion is taken to be constant.
We  do not make any assumption on the sign of p′ (Q) since, a priori, an
increase in economic liberties has an ambiguous impact on a government’s sur-
vival. Consider for example a reform plan pushing toward more liberalization. On
the one hand, since reforms reduce the privileges enjoyed by some who support
the government,5 the risk that the incumbent government will be thrown out of
office may rise. On the other hand, reforms may reduce the probability of upheaval
in the part of society that is not adequately represented by the ruling government.6
Whatever the relationship between policies and political survival, the qualitative
results we obtain do not depend on the sign of p′ (Q). However, as a purely “tech-
nical” assumption, we will take p′′ (Q)≤ 0.
In our model, the ruling party has two choices. It can either implement a “bad
policy” or concede some economic liberties and make some investment in infras-
tructure (“good policy”). We suppose that economic liberalization alone is not
sufficient to encourage private investment when a country has poor infrastruc-
ture.7 Thus, investment in infrastructure and economic liberties are complemen-
tary. In particular, we assume that the government needs to spend a fixed amount,
I=I – >0,on infrastructure as a condition for economic liberties to be effective.
Good policies thus stimulate private investment, K, and private net production, Y.
In what follows, we define the sum of Z, the country’s endowment, and Y as the
country’s national surplus.8 Obviously, for any given level of φ ,a   higher surplus
will raise consumption by the ruling elite.
Events unfold in two stages.
• In stage 1, the country has an endowment equal to Z, composed of natural
resources and foreign aid. The government decides on a policy plan (Q,I),
and it remains in power with probability p(Q). If the government survives, it
carries out the plan: the desired level of Q is implemented, and the investment
cost I is sunk.
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5Ndulu and O’Connell (1999) report the example of Zambia during the 1980s, where reforms were
fiercely opposed by strong pressure groups that enjoyed the benefits of bad policies. These authors argue
that reforms often increase opposition to governments and encourage dictators to resist development:
“President Mobutu opposed Zairian development . . . because development raised the threat of political
demise and the loss of his substantial claim on GDP.”
6La Ferrara (1996) considers a model (without production) in which the decision of a self-interested
government to liberalize trade depends on its retaining political support. In Robinson (1999), the provi-
sion of public goods by an autocratic government may encourage collective actions, such as revolutions,
on the part of the citizens.
7See McGuire and Olson (1996) and Collier and Gunning (1999). Safe property rights, or a favorable
taxation regime, may not be enough when transportation routes are not available, or when the available
workforce suffers from analphabetism or cannot migrate. Thus, both reforms and infrastructure are taken
to be indispensable for private entrepreneurship in the rest of society.
8This is a notion of gross national surplus. In fact, the country’s net surplus is equal to Z+Y minus
expenditure in infrastructure, I.• In stage 2, private investors observe (Q,I) and decide the optimal levels of
investment and production, equal to K and Y,r espectively. The government
appropriates a fraction φ (Q) of both Z and Y.
The ruling party’s expected consumption is expressed as9
(2)
where Y(Q,I) denotes the surplus generated by private investment in the rest of
society.
According to expression (2), the ruling elite will extract a share φ of national
surplus with probability p. When the incumbent government is thrown out of
office, an event occurring with probability (1– p), the elite will have a consump-
tion level equal to C ˆ
i ≥ 0. 
Note that the incumbent government will consider whether to implement some
public investment only when the surplus it can extract from the economy is not
smaller than the cost of infrastructure. Thus, the following inequality always holds
in equilibrium:
(3)
The expected level of consumption of the elite when losing power, denoted by
C ˆ
i,d epends on the actions of the new government. In order to characterize C ˆ
i,w e
assume that political change implies such higher costs in public investment that no
new government will ever have an incentive to undertake good policies. Although
quite extreme, this assumption is plausible when political change occurs through
coups or revolutions that cause severe costs to society, such as destruction of
human capital or damage to the existing infrastructure: see, for example,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).10
Since a new government will always undertake bad policies, the expression for
C ˆ
i is given by
(4)
where n denotes the number of equally sized groups in the society.
Under the incumbent government, the level of expected consumption for the
rest of society is given by
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9According to equation (2), the government maximizes expected consumption of the group it repre-
sents, that is, the incumbent government fully identifies itself with the interests of the supporting group.
This is not generally the case. For example, the government might only be interested in the gain for its
own members. Suppose that the government retains a fraction δ∈ [0,1] of the surplus it appropriates, while
leaving the fraction (1–δ ) to its supporters, and assume that the government’s members do not survive
political change. Then, the government’s objective function will take the form δ •{p • [φ (Z+Y)–I]}. This
alternative, however, does not affect the basic conclusions derived from problem (2).
10Our model, however, generates similar results under different assumptions, such as the new gov-
ernment will make reforms with some probability.(5)
where {Z–C ˆ
i} denotes the aggregate amount of consumption available to the rest
of society when the new government takes power.11
In what follows we consider a partisan government that maximizes the
expected consumption (2) of its supporters. In doing so, the government antici-
pates that the level of private investment in the rest of society will depend on its
decisions about Q and I.12 We solve the model by backward induction. Given the
timing we postulate, we first characterize the production decision of private
investors, taking the government’s decisions as given. Second, we solve for the
policy choice, when the government anticipates private investors’ reaction.
Consider first stage 2, when private entrepreneurs have to decide how much
to invest and produce. Given the policy stance of the government, summarized
by the levels of (Q,I) determined in stage 1, each private investor chooses capi-
tal so to maximize consumption, which is equal to the fraction (1– φ ) of pro-
duction net of capital costs. In order to streamline the model without any loss of
generality, it is sufficient to consider the presence of just one entrepreneur who
maximizes his consumption from production, given by (1– φ ) •Y,b y choosing
the level of capital K.
Once the government has picked (Q,I) in stage 1, the entrepreneur’s problem
in stage 2 reduces to:
(6)
with
The function d(I) emphasizes the complementary roles of infrastructure and
reforms. It implies that private investment can be profitable only when there is at
least a minimum level of public investment in infrastructure, I –. The functions
F(K,Q) and C(K) denote, respectively, the return from production and its cost.
These functions have the following properties: FK >0 , FKK <0 , F(0,Q)=0;
C′ (K)>0, C′′ (K)≥ 0.
We assume that poor institutional quality destroys output by generating cor-
ruption, insecure property rights, etc. In other words, an economic environment
plagued by bad policies generates negative externalities in the private sector.13
Thus, the revenue function F(K,Q) captures the effect of economic liberties on
dI II
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11Expressions (2) and (5) build on the idea that the bulk of entrepreneurial initiative, generating
Y(Q,I), does not belong to the elite supporting the incumbent government. This simplification can be eas-
ily generalized without any major consequences for our results. 
12We assume that private capital is fully mobile, in order to avoid time-consistency issues. This prob-
lem, however, is discussed in a later section, “Extensions.”
13A similar assumption is made in Svensson (1998), where poor legal infrastructure is deemed detri-
mental to production. This notion is supported by Hall and Jones’ (1999) evidence on the role of “social
infrastructure” on productivity.private entrepreneurship and has the following properties: FQ>0 ,FQQ<0,FQK >0,
and F(K,0)= 0. Moreover, we assume that 
14
To summarize, expression (6) postulates that net returns from private invest-
ment are strictly positive only if the government invests up to the amount I –in infras-
tructure and implements some economic liberties (i.e., Q>0).15 If I < I –,p r i v a t e
investment is unprofitable, whatever the level of Q. In this case, both the optimal
level of K, denoted by K*, and private surplus Y are equal to zero. By contrast, if
I ≥ I –, K* solves the following condition:
(7)
whenever Q> 0. Private investment increases with reforms, since it holds that
The net private surplus is given by
(8)
Equation (8) represents the entrepreneur’s reaction function to the level of Q when
I ≥ I –. It implies that Y(0,I)=0,YQ(Q,I)>0,YQQ(Q,I)≤ 0 and also that 
In stage 1, the government anticipates private investors’ behavior and solves
the following problem:
(9)
Two cases may arise: (i) the government chooses a level of investment in
infrastructure such that I < I –or (ii) expenditure in infrastructure is set equal to I ≥ I –.
Case (i). If the government chooses a level of public investment equal to I < I –,
the maximand in expression (9) reduces to
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14The following functional forms satisfy the properties stated: F = Qα Kβ , with (α ,β )∈ (0,1) and
C=r •K, with r>0 .
15The assumption that “good policies” are necessary for private investment to generate output is con-
sistent with evidence reported in Easterly and Levine (1997). Svensson (1998) also finds that lack of
investment in legal infrastructure leads to low levels of domestic investment.Since investment in infrastructure is insufficient to stimulate private invest-
ment, the government finds it optimal to set I=0. Thus, the marginal incentive to
reform is given by
(11)
Without making any assumption on the sign of p′(Q), the marginal incentive
to reform is always negative when the condition p′(Q) •φ (Q)+φ′ (Q) •p(Q)<0 holds
true, where φ′ (Q)<0. This condition implies that the elasticity of political survival
to reforms is lower than (the absolute value of) the corresponding elasticity rela-
tive to the appropriation rate, which is
(12)
In what follows, we will assume that condition (12) is always satisfied.16
Then:
Lemma 1.When I=0 and condition (12) holds, the maximum level of expected
consumption for the ruling elite is equal to E[Ci(0,0)]= p(0) •[φ (0) •Z–C ˆ
i]+C ˆ
i.
Case (ii). Suppose that I ≥ I –. Given our assumptions, the government’s opti-
mal choice is to set public investment equal to I –. Hence, the marginal benefit from
reforms is given by
(13)
Consequently, the existence of an internal maximum for Q* requires that the
following first-order condition holds:
(14)
Lemma 2. When I = I –, an internal maximum Q*∈ (0,Q
–
) exists and is unique.
Thus, the level of expected consumption for the ruling elite is equal to
Proof. See Appendix I.
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16A sufficient condition for expression (12) to hold is that p′(Q)≤ 0, that is, that reforms reduce the
probability of political survival.Note that if p′ (Q)≤ 0, the government will have lower incentives to implement
economic liberties.17 In other words, when good policies jeopardize political sur-
vival, the government takes a more conservative attitude toward liberalization. The
reverse is true when better policies buy some support for the government, that is,
when p′ (Q)>0. In this case, the incentive to pursue weak policies will be reduced.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, the following holds:
Result 1. A rational, dictatorial government will decide to implement some
good policies if the following condition holds true:
(15)
Condition (15) can be rewritten as follows:
(15′ )
Expression (15′ ) clarifies the basic mechanisms at work in our model. Without
making any assumption about the sign of p′, the impact of C ˆ
i remains ambiguous.
However, good policies tend to be implemented when the loss of the ability to
appropriate resources Z (first term in the left-hand side) is outweighed by the net
gain arising from private production (second term in the left-hand side). Also, good
policies are more likely to be implemented when the need for infrastructure, denoted
by I –,i s relatively low. Figure 1 illustrates a case in which condition (15) holds.
The level of resources, Z, has a crucial impact both on the opportunity to intro-
duce some economic liberalization and on the degree to which good policies are
pursued. We summarize these findings in the following:
Result 2. (i) When the government is solely interested in the welfare of the
party it represents, resource abundance (high Z) makes the implementation of
good policies less likely. Moreover, (ii) even when some reforms are implemented,
a higher level of resources will induce more conservatism (lower Q*) in the gov-
ernment’s behavior.
Proof. See Appendix II.
Result 2 underlies the central implication of the model. Governments of coun-
tries rich in resources, be they natural resources or fungible donations, have low
incentives to implement economic liberalization. In some cases, resource abun-
dance may eliminate the incentive to implement any reform. And when some
reforms are undertaken, resource abundance pushes the incumbent government to
adopt weaker reforms.
The government’s ability to appropriate a large share of resources is a measure
of the opportunity cost of reforms. In this regard, the incumbent government
pQ Q p Z
pQ Q YQ I I pQ p C i
**
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17The role of p′(Q) can be better emphasized by rewriting the right-hand side of expression (13) as
p′ • [φ (Z+Y)–I ––C ˆ
i]+φ′ • p • (Z+Y)+φ • p • YQ,w here it holds that [φ (Z+Y)–I –]>C ˆ
i (the ruling party
cannot do worse than giving up power and getting C ˆ
i).behaves similarly to a monopolist who, with limited competitive pressure, prefers
the “quiet life” to costly effort investment.18 In the present model, political com-
petition may induce the incumbent to adopt better policies when political survival
lies in increasing reforms, i.e., p′(Q)>0.
Result 2’s pessimistic connotation for foreign aid must be qualified in a num-
ber of ways. We have deliberately neglected the possibility that, in stage 1, the
government might be subject to financial constraints when deciding whether to
make the up-front investment I –. The presence of financial constraints alone can
prevent good policies. This occurs when a government is willing to reform, but it
cannot borrow to finance the cost of infrastructure I –. In this case, foreign aid can
overcome financial constraints and make reforms feasible.19
In the next section we consider some forms of conditional aid that may pro-
vide the incentive to implement good policies.
Foreign Aid and Conditionality
The incentives from aid crucially depend on the type of support a country receives.
The conclusion from Result 2 that countries rich in resources have little incentive
to implement good policies has important implications for aid such as donations








Figure 1. The Optimal Level of Q
18See Hermalin (1992) and the literature quoted therein. We thank a referee for the suggested analogy.
19Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Dollar and Svensson (2000) show that foreign aid can help the suc-
cess of reform programs only when there are adequate political-economic conditions. As Dollar and
Svensson put it, “the role of donors is to identify reformers not to create them” (p. 896).or  credit extensions,w hich are largely administered by local governments.
Donations, denoted by A,r aise the country’s endowment Z. Consequently, our
model predicts that this type of aid tends to reduce the optimal level of Q* or, at
the extreme, reinforces the desire to keep bad policies in place.20
With other types of aid less pessimistic conclusions can be reached. In what
follows, we consider two types of intervention. First, we consider the case of con-
ditional aid as a device to reward reforms. Second, we consider the possibility that
aid is directly aimed at providing some pieces of infrastructure.
Making aid conditional on reforms. Suppose that donors condition aid on the
level of economic liberties that is actually implemented. The amount of aid,
denoted by H=H(Q), will be made dependent upon the level of economic liber-
ties Q according to
(16)
Thus, donors will concede a positive amount of aid to the country only if the gov-
ernment implements at least a minimum level of reforms Qc. Under such a
scheme, the government has the following options:
(i) Give up aid and keep bad policies, so as to get payoff E[Ci(0,0)] as in
Lemma 1;
(ii) Agree to set Qc without investing in infrastructure, so that I=Y=0; or
(iii) Agree to set at least Qc and invest I=I –.
Under cases (ii)–(iii), the government’s payoff (2) takes the form:
(17)
It is immediately evident that the government will prefer plan (iii) to plan (ii)
whenever its participation constraint φ (Qc) •  Y(Qc,I –)–I –≥ 0 is satisfied. In general,
this will be the case when donors set Qc appropriately. Moreover, plan (iii) will be
preferred to plan (i) when the level of conditional aid H ˜ is sufficiently high. Thus,
when properly designed, conditional aid may induce partisan governments to
adopt better policies, so as to enjoy the promised reward. This conclusion, how-
ever, must be accompanied with great caution, since it ignores obstacles such as
the ability of donors to verify the actual quality of reforms.21, 22
We next consider direct help with infrastructure, a form of aid that may reduce
the “funds fungibility” problem. This kind of aid policy naturally arises out of the
approach followed here.
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20This observation is consistent with the view that aid can delay reforms: see Rodrik (1996) and
Tsikata (1998).
21Indeed, doubts are often raised about the actual incidence of reforms: “...increasingly, the suspicion
must be that the deception is deliberately designed to gain just enough respectability to attract private for-
eign capital, and to qualify more readily for the public sort, from multilateral bodies such as the IMF and
the World Bank” (The Economist, “Phoney Democracies,” June 24, 2000).
22Time-consistency problems may also arise. In a game between donors and recipients, Svensson
(2000b) shows that the anticipation of aid may reduce the incentive to introduce costly reforms. The abil-
ity to enforce types of conditional aid is also discussed in Dollar and Easterly (1999).Direct provision of infrastructure aid. Foreign countries or international orga-
nizations might invest directly in parts of the infrastructure, such as roads, health
care, schools, etc. This form of aid has two desirable properties. First, it limits the
flow of fungible funds to local governments. Second, it cuts the cost of infra-
structure I – by the amount of aid, X. Thus, from the point of view of the incumbent
government, this particular form of donation reduces the amount of public invest-
ment it must make.
This point can be simply illustrated as follows. By denoting direct provision to the
infrastructure by X∈ [0,I –], the equilibrium payoff from good policies is now given by
(18)
On the other hand, the payoff from keeping bad policies in place remains
equal to E[Ci(0,0)] = p(0) • [φ (0) • Z–C ˆ
i]+C ˆ
i.
Consequently, the government will be willing to implement some good poli-
cies if the analog of condition (15) holds:
(19)
There exists a value of X in the interval [0,I –] such that condition (19) is satis-
fied. To show this, it is sufficient to note that when X= I –,a   marginal quantity of
good policies yields a payoff that exceeds the “bad policy” payoff (Q=0). Thus,
the following holds:
Result 3. When donors can provide an adequate amount of infrastructure aid
directly, autocratic governments will have the incentive to implement some reforms.
This conclusion crucially depends on the complementarity between economic
liberties and infrastructure. When international aid can provide some help with
infrastructure, the costs of good policies are reduced, while their benefits remain
intact. Furthermore, this type of aid can also circumvent the problems associated
with financial constraints that prevent governments from borrowing and investing.
In the next section we consider some extensions to the basic model presented
in the previous section.
Extensions
Government benevolence
The model presented in the first part of Section I postulates that the government is
interested only in the welfare of its supporters. In this section we extend the model
to consider the possibility that the government may also care, to some extent,
about the welfare of the rest of society. In other words, the objective function of
the government puts a weight, denoted by β , on the expected level of consumption
available to the rest of society, E(Cr). β is defined over the support [0,1/2]. When
β =0,the government puts no weight on the welfare of the rest of society, as pos-
tulated in the first part of Section I above. On the contrary, when β = 1/2, the gov-
ernment values the welfare of its supporters as much as the welfare of those in the
rest of society. “Benevolence” can be thought of as a simple modeling device that
ECQ I X EC X I ii
*,, , , . − ( ) [] ≥ ( ) [] ∈ [] 00 0    with   
ECQ I X pQ Q ZY Q I IX C C i ii
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try on the actions of the government (see Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993).
To  simplify the exposition, we assume that political risk is independent of
reforms, that is, p′(Q)=0. Also, we suppose that the government always finds it
convenient to implement some reforms, that is, we assume that condition (15) is
always satisfied.
When 0 < β < 1/2, the government’s problem becomes
(20)
where E(Ci) and E(Cr) are defined, respectively, by (2) and (5) for I = I –.
The first-order condition relative to problem (20) can be written as
(21)
where, from (13) with p′ =0,
The following holds:
Result 4. When the government has some care for the welfare of the rest of
society, it will concede more liberties than an autocratic government will. Thus,
when 0 < β < 1/2, it holds that Q*(β )>Q*(0).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from inspection of (21). The presence
of some benevolence on behalf of the average government adds a positive term to
the left-hand side of (21) whenever condition 0 < β < 1/2 holds. Hence, the greater
the care of the typical government for the rest of society, the greater the net
marginal benefits from good policies.
From a political-economic perspective, it is plausible to restrict attention to
the case in which condition β < 1/2 holds. Even in democracies, it is quite unlikely
that the average government has the same care for the rest of society as it has for
its supporters. However, the special case of β = 1/2 carries an interesting implica-
tion. When β = 1/2, the government will implement the highest feasible level of
economic liberties.23 This ideal case is what McGuire and Olson (1996) define as
“consensual democracy.”
Differences in the government’s ability to extract surplus
In the first part of Section I we assumed that the government extracts the fraction
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23When β = 1/2, the government’s objective function (20) reduces to 1/2{p • [Y(Q,I –)–I –]+Z}. The net
marginal benefit from Q is then equal to p • YQ(Q,I –), which is positive over [0,Q –]. Thus, the optimal level
of Q for β = 1/2 is Q –.it easier to extract rents from natural resources than from private output. In this
case, the objective function (9) can be rewritten as24
(22)
where φ (Q)>ρ (Q) for any given level of Q. Assume that ρ (Q)=m • φ (Q), with
m<1. Then, since it holds true that25
(23)
it follows that a lower m will decrease the equilibrium level Q*. Thus, the gov-
ernment will adopt weaker policies when its ability to appropriate private surplus
is reduced.
Dependence of private sector production function on natural
resources
In the first part of Section I, production in the private sector does not depend on
natural resources: see equation (6). However, natural resources may affect private
surplus, as when Y=A(Z) • f(K,Q,I). Although the effect of Z on Y is a priori
ambiguous,26 we will concentrate on the case of A′ (Z)>0.
We  first reconsider Result 2(i). When A′ (Z)>0, resource abundance makes
bad policies more likely if the condition Θ – p(Q*)φ (Q*)A′ (Z) • f(K(Q*),Q*,I –)>0
still holds true, where Θ >0  (see Appendix II). Thus, Result 2(i) will still hold,
unless A′ (Z) is sufficiently large.
Result 2(ii) predicted that when the government prefers to adopt some good
policies (i.e., condition (15) is satisfied), a higher level of resources will lower the
desired level of reforms Q*. Under the present case, it holds that 
where E and D are negative quantities (see Appendix II), while the term in braces
is positive (see condition (23)). Thus, when A′ (Z)>0 is not too large, resources
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24We assume condition (15).
25Inequality (23) follows from the fact that a strictly positive equilibrium level of liberties (Q*>0 )
implies that the term (p •φ •Y) in expression (9) is increasing (at a decreasing rate) in Q∈ [0,Q*].
26On the one hand, abundance of natural resources might generate some “comparative advantage” for
the development of industries that use these resources as an input. In this case, it will hold that A′ (Z)>0.
On the other hand, abundant resources may have negative effects on private production. For example,
resources may reduce human capital by discouraging education (see Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega,
1999, and Gylfason, 2001), or by stimulating allocation of talent in unproductive activities (see Baland
and Francois, 2000). Also, natural resources may generate negative externalities on traded manufacturing
activities (see Sachs and Warner, 1999). Then, it may also hold that A′(Z)<0.Time inconsistency
In the basic model of the first part of Section I we assumed that private capital is
fully mobile. In other words, private entrepreneurs can withdraw their capital at no
cost when the economic environment of the country is no longer favorable. In that
case, the government will appropriate the fraction φ of net private surplus, denoted
by Y(K,Q,I –)=F(K,Q)–C(K), and entrepreneurs will choose capital K* so as to
respect the rule FK=C K. By taking p′ =0 for simplicity, the optimal Q* then satis-
fies the following condition (see (14)):
(24)
where F*=F(K*(Q),Q) and C*=C(K*(Q)).
Many contributions, such as those of Grout (1984) and Hart (1995), have shown
however that when capital is specific and has to be “sunk” ex ante, opportunistic
behavior can arise ex post. This time-consistency problem can apply also to the pre-
sent context, when a government’s opportunism arises from the inability to make a
full commitment ex ante. Consider the following sequence of events. First, the gov-
ernment chooses a policy plan (Q,I). Second, entrepreneurs observe the policy plan
and choose the optimal level of capital to invest (for simplicity, we assume that in
this case the capital is fully immobile). Third, the government appropriates a frac-
tion φ of private surplus. Since private capital expenditure C(K) has been sunk, the
government may now be able to extract a fraction φ of the gross private surplus,
F(K,Q).27 In this case, the government’s objective function takes the form
(25)
while private entrepreneurs will choose capital K** according to the rule
(26)
Thus, for any given level of Q, the equilibrium level of K** will be lower than
K*, corresponding to the basic case of the first part of Section I. A government’s
opportunism tends to reduce private investment.
Note, however, that opportunism has ambiguous effects on the optimal policy
plan of the government. This can be shown by maximizing (25) subject to (26).
When p′ =0, one finds that the optimal level of Q** is implicitly given by
(27)
where F**=F (K**(Q),Q).
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27Similarly to Grout (1984), the argument can be made more formal by considering appropriation as
the result of a Nash-bargaining process over F(K,Q) between the government and the entrepreneur. The
entrepreneur has indispensable skills in production, while the government has the ability to halt private
production, and its bargaining power is equal to φ . In this case, the share that goes to the government,
si =φ •F, is what maximizes the Nash program (si)φ •(F–si)1–φ .Inspection of (24) and (27) shows that the net effect of opportunism on the
equilibrium level of policies is ambiguous. In particular, when the indirect effect
of Q on the “tax base” F, as captured by FK
• — dK**
—
dQ >0,is sufficiently strong, oppor-
tunism tends to generate a Q** higher than Q*. As an example, we compare the
left-hand sides of (24) and (27) when F=Q1/2 •K1/2 and C=r•K (see footnote 14).
It turns out that, when the (sufficient) condition 1/4≤φ≤ 1/2 holds true, opportunism
will generate better policies.
II. Evidence
Our model builds on the following mechanism:
(i) Poor economic institutions and policies have negative effects on (private)
investment and production.
(ii) Abundance of resources reduces the incentive of an elitist government to
implement “good policies.”
Thus, resources tend to have a negative effect on economic activity through
the quality of economic institutions and policies. In particular:
(a) When a country is rich in natural resources, the government has a bigger
incentive to raid the national surplus by keeping poor institutions and
unsound policies in place, as emphasized by Result 2. The model thus pre-
dicts that measures of natural resources have a negative impact on the
quality of economic institutions and policies.
(b) Since foreign aid raises resources, it will lower the quality of economic
policies and institutions. However, if donors manage to condition aid on
the implementation of reforms, aid can even have a positive effect on poli-
cies, as emphasized in the second part of Section I. Thus, the net effect of
aid on policies remains ambiguous a priori.
(c) Since resource abundance reduces the incentive to implement good poli-
cies, it also makes investment in infrastructure less desirable.
Point (i) is quite undisputed. The first three rows in Table 1 report the correla-
tion coefficients between indicators of “good policy” and a few measures of eco-
nomic performance, based on 37 sub-Saharan African countries. Good policies are
measured by: (i) IQ, Knack and Keefer’s (1995) summary measure of indicators of
institutional quality from the International Country Risk Guide; (ii) POLICY,
Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) measure of quality of macroeconomic and trade poli-
cies; and (iii) LTELPW80, Easterly and Levine’s (1997) proxy for infrastructure.
The idea that sound policies and good institutions are positively related to
economic activity has been emphasized in the literature on economic growth: see,
for example, Mauro (1995), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Knack and Keefer
(1995), Svensson (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and
others.28 In particular, Block (2001) finds that growth in GDP per capita is posi-
tively and significantly related both to institutional quality and to proper macro-
economic and trade policies, as measured by low budget deficits and openness to
foreign trade.
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28See also Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobatón (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2000).Point (ii) represents the original contribution of our model. Our framework
highlights the role of resources as a key factor in determining the quality of a
country’s economic institutions and policies. 
The last two rows of Table 1 report the correlation coefficients between measures
of resources29 and indicators of policies’ quality. The variable SNR is Sachs and
Warner’s (1997) measure of natural resource abundance. AID quantifies the amount
of foreign donations. “Good policies” are measured by IQ; POLICY; and DLTELPW,
a proxy for investment in infrastructure.30 The results provide some hints31 consistent
with our model. Our measure of natural resource abundance, SNR, has a negative
effect on our measures of good policies, IQ, POLICY, and DLTELPW. The effects of
foreign aid on policies are much more varied. While aid seems to have adverse effects
on institutional quality, it has a positive effect both on macroeconomic and trade poli-
cies and on investment in infrastructure. These opposite effects of aid are compatible
with the implications of our model. While it is feasible for a donor to put conditions
on macroeconomic and trade policy variables, which are easily verifiable, it is much
more difficult to condition aid on the quality of governance, as measured by IQ.
Much existing empirical evidence also supports our model. Sachs and Warner
(1997, 1999) provide cross-country evidence on the negative effects of natural
resources on institutional quality and growth.32 After confirming the positive
Alberto Dalmazzo and Guido de Blasio
266
Table 1. Economic Performance, Policies, and Resources
IQ POLICY LTELPW80 DLTELPW
GNP per capita 0.37** 0.35 0.45**
(0.05) (0.14) (0.04)
GNP per capita growth rate 0.22 0.46** 0.20
(0.28) (0.05) (0.38)
Gross domestic investment 0.14 0.53** 0.44**
(0.48) (0.02) (0.05)
SNR –0.20 –0.35* –0.31
(0.31) (0.10) (0.14)
AID –0.38* 0.43* 0.37*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Notes: The p-value is in parentheses (2-tailed). ** and * indicate that correlation is significant at
the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. Data sources and additional details are provided in
Appendix III.
29Both measures of resources are backdated with respect to our institutions and policy indicators in
order to reduce “reverse causation” problems.
30In our sample, the correlation coefficient between IQ and POLICY is 0.38. The relationship between
economic policy and institution variables has been investigated in some recent literature: see, for exam-
ple, Havrylyshyn and Van Rooden (2000).
31Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2001) provide an OLS analysis of the relationship between policies and
resources, which adds some robustness to the results reported in Table 1.
32Differently from our approach, Sachs and Warner (1999) argue that increases in natural resources
can make economies shift away from manufacturing, where externalities necessary for growth are gener-
ated. Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) instead use a Ramsey model to show that countries rich in natural
resources display negative rates of growth during the transition to the steady state. For an updated survey
on the “curse of natural resources” see Sachs and Warner (2001).relationship between institutional quality and growth, Block (2001) finds that raw
material abundance has a negative and significant impact on institutional quality in
sub-Saharan African countries. Some literature has also emphasized the perverse
effect of resource windfalls on growth in several countries: see Auty (1990), Gelb
(1998), and Little and others (1993). According to Tornell and Lane (1999), when
legal and political institutions are weak, windfalls in the production sector will
increase the rent-seeking activities of (competing) powerful groups, reducing capi-
tal accumulation and growth.33 For the opposite reason, a negative endowment shock
may raise the incentive to pursue good policies since, according to our model, even
a partisan government may find it convenient to encourage private investment.34 La
Ferrara (1996) finds that negative terms-of-trade shocks increase the probability of
subsequent trade liberalization for a sample of sub-Saharan countries.35
Several papers have concentrated on the effects of international aid. Boone
(1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Dollar and Easterly (1999) on African
countries report evidence showing that aid flows have an ambiguous, and often
negative, impact on investment and growth (see also World Bank, 1998). Dollar
and Svensson (2000) find that domestic political-economic factors are crucial to
the success or failure of policy reform programs supported by adjustment loans.
Alesina and Dollar (2000) consider the effect of shocks to bilateral aid on democ-
ratization and trade liberalization. They conclude that “there is no tendency for
shocks to aid to be followed by changes in democracy or openness.” Alesina and
Weder (1999) find a weak indication that foreign aid creates a “voracity effect”:
countries that receive higher levels of aid tend to have higher levels of corruption.
This evidence is broadly consistent with the conclusion that, when conditionality
is absent or ineffective, aid raises resource abundance and favors “bad policies.”
The empirical analysis developed in Svensson (2000a) is particularly relevant
here. Using a large data set from developing countries, he finds that both aid and
natural resource booms are associated with corruption.
III. Concluding Remarks
Our results point to a central conclusion: abundance of resources can have per-
verse effects on investment and growth. While this conclusion is by no means new,
the novelty of our model lies in the political economy mechanism we investigate.
Here, the incentive of a self-interested government to implement reforms leading
to investment and growth is weaker when resources are abundant. Our explanation
may coexist with other arguments. For example, Gylfason (2001) argues that
resource abundance has a negative effect on growth because it reduces public
investment in education.
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33Tornell and Lane (1999) report some evidence based on oil shocks in Nigeria,Venezuela, and Mexico.
34These implications do not seem at odds with the Latin American experience of the 1980s. In the
wake of debt overhang and negative terms-of-trade shocks (see Warner, 1992), many Latin American
countries have embarked on robust political and economic reforms.
35Barro (1999) also finds that natural resources tend to be associated with lower levels of political
freedom. This is consistent with the idea that resource abundance biases governments against liberaliza-
tion in general.Alberto Dalmazzo and Guido de Blasio
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Our paper gives some suggestions for what donors can do to encourage the
adoption of good policies, that is, how to make foreign aid work. Our results
strongly argue in favor of making aid conditional on reforms and providing direct
infrastructure aid. Theoretically, these forms of aid are superior to unconditional
money donations. Donors should, however, pay more attention to the quality of
institutions, levels of corruption, safer property rights, etc.
The political economy channel we emphasize implies that reforms involve a
trade-off for a self-interested government. On the one hand, by implementing
reforms, the government benefits from a larger national surplus; on the other hand,
the government can extract only a reduced fraction of the national surplus.
However, there are some caveats to be made. First, when better policies buy some
support for the government, the perverse role of resource abundance on reforms is
reduced. There are indeed virtuous cases, the best known being Botswana, in
which abundance of natural resources has gone hand in hand with very high rates
of growth. Second, there could be impediments to the ability to pursue reforms,
even for governments seriously committed to them. Politically unpopular policies
typically have low chances of being implemented, in particular in countries with-
out strong civil institutions or with a high level of poverty and unemployment. For
these reasons, a promising direction for future research would be to analyze the
relation between resource abundance and incentives to reform—emphasized in
this paper—within a general model of political transitions, along the lines
sketched by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
APPENDIX I
Proof of Lemma 2
The objective function E[Ci(Q,I
–
)] is continuous and differentiable in Q.
Existence. Consider the expression for 
∂ E(Ci) ——
∂ Q given in (12). Existence of an internal solution
for Q* follows directly from the fact that both conditions (i) lim
Q→ 0
∂ E(Ci) ——
∂ Q > 0 and (ii) lim
Q→ Q –
∂ E(Ci) ——









)=∞ . Concavity of φ also ensures that lim







)=0 and, under condition (12), the inequality













Q pp Z Y p I C
→→
() []
= ′ ⋅+′ ⋅ () ⋅+ [] − ′ ⋅+ [] {} <
∂








Q pp Z p I C p Y
→→
() []




∂ φφ φ ˆUniqueness. To  demonstrate uniqueness of the maximum Q*, we consider the second-
order condition:
(A1.3)
When the first-order condition 
∂ E(Ci) ——
∂ Q = 0 is satisfied, the following holds:
(A1.4)
Then, by calculating (A1.3) under (A1.4), one finds that:
(A1.5)
Thus, since the objective function is continuous and differentiable, there is a unique global
maximum.
APPENDIX II
Proof of Result 2
Part (i). Recall that, from (4), C ˆ
i depends on Z. Using the envelope theorem, the effect of a
larger level of Z on the payoff corresponding to “bad policies” is given by
(A2.1)
On the other hand, the effect of Z on the government’s payoff under “good policies” is equal to
(A2.2)
We claim that, under condition (12), a larger Z has a stronger impact on the payoff from
bad policies, that is, the following holds:
(A2.3)
The proof of the claim is immediate when p′ (Q)≥ 0. When p′ (Q)<0, condition (A2.3) can be
rewritten as 
(A2.4)
This inequality is satisfied, since p′ <0 ,φ′ <0,and nφ (0)–1 > 0 (the dominant elite gets a share
φ of national surplus that is higher than its weight in society, 1/n). Consequently, the more
abundant the resources, the less likely condition (15) will be met.
Part (ii). When condition (12) holds, differentiation of (14) implies that
dQ*
–––
dZ < 0. Thus, an
increase in resources will discourage the government from reform and, as a consequence of
fewer reforms, the equilibrium level of private production will be lower: see equation (8).
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List of Countries and Variables Used in Table 1
List of countries: Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central
African Republic; Congo, Dem. Rep. of; Congo, Rep. of; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia; Ghana;
Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Ivory Coast; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali;
Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Somalia; Sudan; Swaziland;
Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
GNP per capita, GNP per capita growth rate, and Gross domestic investment (public plus pri-
vate investment) are calculated as percentage of GNP over the period 1990–1995 (source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators).
SNR denotes the share of mineral production in GNP in 1971. This variable characterizes the
structural relevance of natural resources in a country.
AID is calculated as the average amount of aid per country as a fraction of GNP over the period
1965–1980. This variable aggregates different types of aid (conditional and unconditional aid,
bilateral or multilateral aid, donations, and debt relief) from heterogeneous sources (IMF,
World Bank, etc.).
IQ summarizes the following indicators: “rule of law”; corruption in government; and “quality
of bureaucracy.” For each country, IQ is calculated as an average of yearly observations from
1982 to 1998.
POLICY is given by (1.28+6.85 × Budget surplus–1.40 × Inflation+2.16 × Openness),w here
Budget surplus is the share of fiscal balance over GDP and Openness is Sachs and Warner’s
openness dummy. For each country, POLICY is calculated as an average of yearly observations
from 1985 to 1995.
LTELPW80 denotes (the log of) telephones per 1,000 workers in 1980. This variable measures
the level of telecommunications and seems to be strongly correlated with other infrastructure
variables (see Collier and Gunning, 1999).
DLTELPW is defined as the difference between LTELPW80 and LTELPW70 and measures the
increment of (the log of) telephones per 1,000 workers between 1980 and 1970.
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